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Abstract  
In this essay, we seek to understand how the stunning rise of data vacuuming, necessitated 
by the pretense of ‘partnership’ within global health, has fundamentally altered how routine 
health data in poor countries is collected, analyzed, prioritized, and used to inform 
management and policy. Writing as a team of authors with experiences on multiple sides of 
global health partnerships in the United States, Mozambique, Nepal, Lesotho, Kenya, and 
Cote d’Ivoire, we argue that solidarity-based partnership between donor and recipient 
countries is impossible when evidence production and management is effectively outsourced 
to external organizations to meet the criteria of donor partners. Specifically, to meet the 
2030 Sustainable Development Goals, equity-oriented strategies are critically needed to 
create data collection, analysis, and use activities that are mutually beneficial and sustainable. 
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The new oil 
During Fortune magazine’s annual, invitation-only ‘Brainstorm Tech’ conference in 2016 in 
Aspen, Colorado, a venture capitalist named Shivon Zilis announced to the crowd of leaders 
from Fortune 500 companies and top emerging entrepreneurs of the tech world, ‘Data is the 
new oil’ (quoted in Vanian 2016).1 This declaration embraces the increasing market value 
that data holds, not simply as a tool for making corporations more efficient or effective but 
also as a currency of the global marketplace itself. In postcolonial states marred by centuries 
of violent extraction economies, this announcement holds particular poignancy and a fair 
measure of threat. In these states and economies, too, data is capital, but capital of another 
sort, in the service of global health, development, and aid projects. And in global health in 
particular, data is capital that is harvested from sites, passed between partners, used to audit 
and surveil systems, and ultimately deployed to justify and promote subsequent rounds of 
project making and data gathering. These dynamics, which we call ‘data vacuuming’, are a 
key feature of contemporary global health projects and partnerships, and yet another way in 
which those with power in the global health field reinforce their position by controlling 
health information access, flow, and use. We deploy the vacuuming trope because it captures 
the sense that anything of value in these impoverished health settings is mined, essentially 
sucked out. Indeed, as we argue here, ‘data is the new oil’ not only in its neocolonial value 
and extractive dynamics but in its capacity to grease the wheels of global health partnerships 
that are often also inequitable.  
With the signing of the Alma Ata declaration at the International Conference on Primary 
Health Care, held in Alma Ata in 1978, countries around the globe committed to ensuring 
health as a human right, acknowledging that ‘all countries should cooperate in a spirit of 
partnership and service to ensure primary health care for all people since the attainment of 
health by people in any one country directly concerns and benefits every other country’ 
(World Health Organization 1978). This declaration was the first to express the need for 
urgent universal action by governments, health and development workers, and the world 
community to protect and promote the health of all people. It was also the first to declare 
the express importance of primary health care – and of partnerships and solidarity – as core 
strategies. However, soon after this historic document was signed, and in response to the 
global economic crisis and subsequent rise of neoliberalism in wealthy nations, the goal of 
primary health care for all was modified to ‘selective primary health care’ by larger donor 
nations who felt overwhelmed by the potential financial implications of fully accepting this 
global mandate. This turn toward selective primary health care prioritized technological 
 
1 Jonathan Vanian is a tech journalist who writes for a variety of newspapers and magazines, including Fortune. 
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‘silver bullet’-type interventions designed to address specific diseases and deemed practical, 
financially feasible, measurable, and politically unthreatening (Brown, Cueto, and Fee 2006). 
Data vacuuming emerges out of this strange trajectory of efforts to build health systems in 
developing countries over the past few decades after the ideal of Alma Ata was abandoned 
(Packard 2016). A similar approach continues today, fueled by the push to translate a 
neoliberal ethos into the health sector, and has evolved into a de facto acceptance of 
evidence-based medicine and ‘cost-effective’ strategizing.  
These trends have coalesced into a heightened reliance on multiplying and increasingly 
disaggregated health indicators in order to measure project outcomes, which has facilitated 
support for data vacuuming activities and expanded public–private partnerships. Vincanne 
Adams (2016) discusses this distorting preoccupation with health metrics, and how it 
impacts what interventions are funded and delivered in the global South. She looks not only 
at the cult of metrics but also how this fixation has afforded a small group of 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) enough power to effectively shape health services 
for millions. She argues that by focusing only on what is quantifiable, there is a devaluation 
of what cannot be measured, even if the unmeasurable is what is ultimately most important 
to patients (Adams 2016). Simultaneously, global health is witnessing the evolution of an 
‘unruly mélange’ of multilateral and bilateral donors and NGOs, who in addition to strongly 
influencing health funding priorities, have paved the way for private-sector partners and 
industry-linked foundations to enter into the international health arena (Buse and Walt 
1997). ‘Partnerships’ are established between the host governments and this mélange of 
actors. But these working relationships, rather than emulating the ideals of the Alma Ata 
declaration, are anchored by an infusion of financial accountability systems and tools, and 
enabled through the insatiable provision of data for donors (Adams 2016).  
In this article, we seek to understand how the dramatic proliferation of data vacuuming, 
facilitated under the auspice of ‘partnership’, has fundamentally transformed how routine 
health data in poor countries is collected, analyzed, prioritized, and used to inform both 
management and policy. Writing as a team of authors with experiences on multiple sides of 
global health partnerships in the United States, Mozambique, Nepal, Lesotho, Kenya, and 
Cote d’Ivoire, we argue that solidarity-based partnership between donor and recipient 
countries is impossible when evidence production and management is effectively outsourced 
to external organizations in order to meet the criteria of donor partners. 
The global health ‘space’ 
In the last fifteen years, an increasing number of individuals from the technology field have 
participated in and influenced global health, which has resulted in both changes to the field 
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and its lexicon. One often-used phrase by this powerful group is ‘global health space’, which 
is used by global health ‘techies’2 to convey their view of the field as potentially expansive 
and influential in and across countries and regions, both in terms of positive impact on 
population-level health and potential opening of markets (Kenworthy this issue). Data is 
fundamental to this potential. In the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation resource Global Health 
Envisioning: Data for Impact, data is highlighted as a critical means to ‘inform better decisions 
across the global health and development space’ (Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 2015). 
The encroachment of data vacuuming into the global health ‘space’ is in many ways linked to 
the changing landscape of the health sector in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) 
that is defined increasingly by NGO projects substituting for public sector health systems 
(Smith 2007). Crane (this issue) maintains that the optimistic public face of partnership 
espoused by donor and NGO partners in fact veils deep Western anxieties surrounding 
African corruption and mismanagement (see also Okeke this issue; Boum this issue). Pfeiffer 
(2003) has documented how international aid was being increasingly channeled through 
NGOs rather than directly to ministries of health and implemented via expatriate technical 
advisors in resource-constrained settings, a phenomenon he felt was fueled primarily by the 
neoliberal focus on privatization. Regardless of the main drivers, in recent years, funds 
flowing to NGOs from bilateral institutions and foundations have been greater than entire 
local government investments in the health sector, and the planning and management of 
these NGO projects falls fully outside the span of local government control. According to a 
recent report, NGOs, along with private foundations, have made the most significant gains 
in attracting development assistance for health, representing 30.1 percent in 2016 compared 
with 7.6 percent in 1990 (an astonishing 2,005 percent increase over the twenty-seven year 
period) (Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 2017).  
Thus, along with the ‘projectification’ and ‘vertical funding’ of public health has come the 
burden of enormous data collection demands by donors to demonstrate achievement of 
short-term and narrowly defined outcomes as well as the ‘cost effectiveness’ of specific 
interventions (Whyte 2013). The resulting mainstreaming of data vacuuming for specific 
vertical programs into global health practice has resulted in the creation of a narrow silo of 
public health practice and an abandonment of support for public sector health systems that 
provide integrated primary health care services (Pfeiffer 2016). Storeng and Béhague (2014) 
have argued that the shift toward ‘playing the numbers game’ is influencing much more than 
 
2 We use the term global health ‘techies’ to refer to individuals who previously worked in computers, 
software, and related technologies and have now moved their efforts to global health. Often times 
these individuals bring language and paradigms from their former field. 
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the development of, and adherence to, uniform indicators or targets. Rather, it is influencing 
how medical and public health research is conceptualized, carried out, understood, and 
disseminated.  
The increasing focus on donor-defined and donor-driven data collection and metrics is part 
of the larger shift toward ‘audit culture’, where donor countries and global initiatives 
determine funding priorities for recipient countries and where administrators and 
accountants, rather than programmatic experts, take on the role of measuring and evaluating 
performance, and as such are funding gatekeepers (Strathern 2000). As Shore and Wright 
(2015, 24) state, ‘What is new about audit culture is the extent to which measurement and 
ranking have become institutionalised, extended and above all, financialized’. They also note 
that language around global health organizational governance has changed to reflect this 
influence. Words such as ‘assets’, ‘income’, ‘liability’, ‘opportunity costs’, ‘products’, ‘output’, 
‘overheads’, ‘revenue’, ‘return on investment’, ‘transparency’, and ‘value for money’ have 
joined the everyday global health lexicon and convey an assumed sense of objectivity, despite 
its very real subjectivity (Shore and Wright 2015).  
Audit cultures in global health also reinforce hierarchical roles. Those who control financial 
resources are the donors, such as bilateral or multilateral agencies; those who decide what is 
being measured are the NGOs, under the influence of specific donors; and those who must 
measure are the ministries of health, or, when ministry capacity is limited, NGOs (or 
‘implementing partners’ as they are aptly referred to in-country), complete this duty. Thus, 
‘playing the numbers game’ has reinforced a power dynamic that makes untenable any 
possibility of equal partnership as conceptualized at Alma Ata. The auditing and infusion of 
targets and indicators for data vacuuming are now largely defined at a distance, by large 
global donors who have systematically asserted their power and control via remote 
surveillance (Greenhalgh 1996; Birn 2009).  
This phenomenon occurs in a context of steep resource inequities that fuel data vacuuming 
practices. NGOs, specifically implementing partners funded by the US President’s 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), have clean, expansive offices with multiple 
functional printers, copiers, faxes and other devices. They are fully staffed, and salaries are 
large and include benefits, at least for expatriate staff, such as schooling allowances for 
children and generous housing subsidies (Pfeiffer 2003). Most multilateral and bilateral 
donors have followed suit and keep up with the salaries and benefits of PEPFAR-funded 
NGOs on the premise that they need to be competitive in the ‘development staffing market’. 
By contrast, ministry of health personnel operate in a parallel, underfunded reality, facing 
limited staffing and budgets that are compounded by shortages of materials and constant 
resource challenges. In addition to encouraging brain drain, these constraints make them 
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beholden to the priorities of funding agents, be they multilateral or bilateral donors, 
foundations, or NGOs.  
This is not a new phenomenon. During a conversation in 2006 between the Ministry of 
Health’s head of health information systems in Mozambique and one of the authors of this 
article, the informant revealed that her technical counterpart, a European man with a 
graduate degree in computer science, seconded to support her and the program through the 
German Development Bank, received a salary of €7,000 (equivalent of US$8,800 per 
month), excluding benefits. In contrast, she, a trained physician, earned a monthly salary of 
19 million meticais (equivalent of US$670 per month). This phenomena of ‘technical 
advisors’ who are embedded to varying degrees within government ministries is not novel; 
however, the salary differentials between the often expatriate advisors and the local 
managers have grown dramatically in the last two decades as development assistance for 
health has expanded (Carr et al. 2010). Similar inequities are reflected in staff housing built 
by the Finnish Development Agency in the 1990s in a central province of Mozambique. 
Expatriate personnel lived in a gated community with lawns and a pool, while the housing of 
locally recruited personnel was located just outside the walls, in a long row of basic two-
room houses. The development was known locally by the nickname, ‘Soweto and Pretoria’, 
after the largely poor and black township, and the mostly rich and white city, in South 
Africa. These distortions, created by development, have led to the increasing divide between 
the needs and priorities of these two entities, the global health industry and the local 
ministries of health, which have facilitated the rise of donor data vacuuming. 
Donor data vacuuming in practice 
Audit culture and global financing systems 
Most poor countries depend on aid from wealthy bilateral and multilateral partners to meet 
the basic health needs of their citizens. Dependency on aid has been cited as a significant 
negative side effect of sustained aid to poorer countries (Moyo 2009). Others have argued 
that international aid prevents country development and sustainable economic growth if 
administered, intentionally or not, as a long-term strategy that consequently inhibits 
development, progress, or reform (World Health Organization Maximizing Positive 
Synergies Collaborative Group 2009; Daschle 2015; Stanford 2015). Stanford (2015) argues 
that real or perceived aid dependency can extend beyond the economic and financial realms 
to include the political, when dependency leads to corruption. Often in these cases donor 
countries devise complex auditing practices including tied-aid strategies, such as vertical 
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funding of specific, donor-prioritized programs, establishing funding conditions, and/or 
routing funding through intermediaries such as NGOs and multilateral agencies. 
Emanating from the paradigm of ‘audit culture’, defined by Shore and Wright (2015, 24) as 
‘the process by which the principles and techniques of accountancy and financial 
management are applied to the governance of people and organisations – and, more 
importantly, the social and cultural consequences of that translation’, these donors’ 
mechanisms for ensuring recipient country accountability ultimately hand greater control to 
the donor country in determining indicators and targets, and the means of aid collection and 
disbursement. This can fundamentally negate the partnership agreement, and encourage 
what Shore and Wright (2015, 24) refer to as ‘steering government from a distance’. This 
further entrenches recipient countries in a cycle of donor dependency beyond their control, 
as donor agencies are increasingly beholden to their own government’s political structures 
and domestic constituent priorities, rather than those of the countries they purport to 
support. This donor culture and the practices it has instituted have facilitated the evolution 
and growth of donor data vacuuming.  In fact, data vacuuming is one amongst a set of 
practices that legitimize donor-defined indicators, as well as delegitimize the priorities of 
recipient countries and their citizens. 
Data vacuuming expands 
A key characteristic of these strategies is the ongoing expansion of new, donor-defined 
indicators and targets for vacuuming. These may be instituted to measure investments in the 
health system, such as the enumeration of completed activities, the number of people served 
in a specific service, the measures of clinical outcomes for patients using the health system, 
the measures of health system efficiency and quality to describe the functionality of services, 
and finally population-level measures that reflect the impact of aid on the health of 
populations of interest. Enhanced monitoring and evaluation systems are deemed important 
and necessary to discern the most effective strategies in health system design, to ensure 
health service quality, and to identify underserved populations and service gaps in need of 
improvement.  
Data vacuuming reinforces audit culture by justifying increased governance by and through 
numbers, algorithms, and audits that drive the development of ‘ever more sophisticated 
systems of knowledge and power that indicators and rankings provide’ (Shore and Wright 
2015, 23). Others have noted that in these audit systems, the more the system fails, the more 
it succeeds; specifically, the system succeeds in further entrenching the accountability system 
and values of the donor instead of those of the recipient government (Strathern 2000). 
Workload for the recipient countries grows in order to meet the increased need for data in 
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ever more disaggregated categories, further justifying the need for donor support. We argue 
that the development and adoption of these indicators is driven by donors, and are in place 
primarily to ensure that countries achieve donors’ programmatic priorities, rather than 
strengthen the health system’s ability to manage itself and ensure broad, evidence-based 
health care is provided effectively and efficiently.  
The idea that measures become the targets at the expense of all else has arisen across studies 
of audit (Power 1994, 1997; Strathern 2000; Hoskin 1996). For example, the widely applied 
disability-adjusted life year (DALY) metric attempts to capture the effect of diseases and 
disabilities on production by quantifying the gap between current health status and an ideal 
health situation (World Health Organization 2017). Critics have questioned whether the 
DALY measure is effective for a number of reasons, critiquing: 1) its inability to detect 
differences in experiencing the same disability across individuals and cultures; 2) its implied 
use as a community-based measure when it was developed for individual-level 
understanding; 3) its inability to account for ‘total disability impact’ (whereby the impact of 
disability on the individual as well as on their partners, children, and communities is 
captured); and, perhaps most importantly, 4) its failure to take into account cultural and 
gender-specific health concerns (Laurie 2014; Farmer 2013; Arnesen and Nord 1999). These 
critiques resonate with our argument that DALYs and other elements of audit culture 
amplify those health issues that can be measured and omit those that don’t fit (Nichter 
2008). Likewise, these globally agreed-upon measures don’t always fit when applied to 
smaller groups working in smaller, sometimes-fragmented catchment areas. They are, simply, 
reductive in their approach of what they seek to measure (Adams 2016).   
PEPFAR, since its inception in 2003, has had possibly the greatest impact on the expansion 
of audit culture in donor-recipient nations, specifically those with the highest burden of 
HIV/AIDS. As of 2017, PEPFAR has contributed more than US$70 billion to ameliorate 
the effects of HIV/AIDS and eradicate its transmission, and has, until recently, received 
strong bipartisan support within the US political system (PEPFAR, 2017a). The tremendous 
amount of money from this initiative provided its power brokers – namely USAID and the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and their implementing agencies 
(NGOs) – with an immediate and outsized influence on the data used to assess their impact 
(Pfeiffer et al. 2010). Within the structure of PEPFAR, the majority of funds are provided to 
NGOs that work with health systems at national, subnational, and health-facility levels. The 
advent of NGOs funded via PEPFAR as implementing partners has introduced new 
challenges, including donor coordination and the phenomenon of internal brain drain 
(Pfeiffer et al. 2008; Sherr et al. 2012).  
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PEPFAR responds to the United States Congress for continued funding, and thus the 
interests of US lawmakers (whether or not they are the same as recipient countries) are 
prioritized. In order to continue receiving acutely needed funding, health managers in 
recipient countries must continue to meet the data expectations of donors. This capacity 
building requires the creation of expanded monitoring and evaluation systems that both take 
up space and influence priorities (Douglas-Jones 2018). For example, between 2010 and 
2017, the number of reporting indicators required by PEPFAR of recipient entities 
decreased from forty to twenty-nine. However, the collection of disaggregated data per 
indicator skyrocketed. In 2010, an additional thirty-plus data points were needed to comply 
with disaggregation requirements, including differing age groups by gender (which were not 
in sync with country-level classifications), HIV status, adherence level, reporting period, 
treatment status, and project funding (PEPFAR 2017b). By 2017, more than 350 additional 
data points were required, an amount that varied depending on the types of projects funded 
(PEPFAR 2009, 2017b).  
Impact on practice 
The last fifteen years has demonstrated that the vacuuming of increasingly complex data 
eventually demands external support, which alters global health practices. When the 
collation, analysis, and use of data remain no longer within the purview of local health 
workers and managers, the use of data to improve health care delivery dissipates. The target 
moves from improving health outcomes in poorer countries to meeting the goals and 
benchmarks set by wealthier countries. Donor data vacuuming also leads to resource 
vacuuming.  If recipient countries are not capable of collecting the data points required, then 
NGOs will collect the data, for a fee from donors, thus further stripping resources from the 
recipient country’s health care system.  
Data vacuuming can be seen as a means to an end in global health, and master narratives 
such as the Countdown to 2015 initiative are emblematic of this audit logic. Countdown to 
2015 was created by a technical working group of ‘experts in the field’: sixty-nine individuals 
based in the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Australia. Although the 
strategy was intended for countries of the global South, just four (6 percent) of the experts 
came from the global South (one each from Brazil, Pakistan, South Africa, and Senegal).3 
 
3 Countdown to 2015 (http://www.who.int/pmnch/Countdownto2015FINALREPORT-apr7.pdf) was a 
World Health Organization-sponsored ten-year initiative established in 2005 to stimulate country 
action by setting and tracking coverage for interventions needed to attain Millennium Development 
Goals 4 and 5, and, in addition, parts of Millennium Development Goals 1, 6, and 7. See also 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/. 
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Countdown to 2015 was a global target-setting framework explicitly created to monitor and 
hold countries accountable for progress made towards the Millennium Development Goals, 
through the adoption of performance indicators that were intended to stimulate better and 
stronger efforts at the country level (Requejo 2015). Nichter (2008, 2) has argued that the use 
and control of data is intentional and required ‘to perpetuate master narratives that shape 
how solutions to global health problems are conceptualized’. Thus, the exportation of target 
and audit culture from wealthier countries to poorer countries, through mechanisms such as 
Countdown to 2015, affords donors the right to create master narratives for beneficiary 
nations. This includes narratives about making intermittent progress towards constantly 
moving targets.  
Such narratives justify the donors’ putting first their home countries’ concerns over those of 
beneficiary nations, and they support donor governments’ prioritization of reporting 
requirements that align with their own political structures, often at the expense of what is 
feasible and ultimately best for under-resourced health systems in recipient countries. From 
the perspective of recipient countries, donors’ reporting needs only grow, with new 
indicators or increasingly disaggregated metrics, each year more onerous to collect, report, 
disseminate, and use locally.  
Figure 1 shows the average full days per quarter that health managers in one district in 
Tanzania spent writing reports for both the Ministry of Health and donors in 2006, three 
years after the advent of PEPFAR. This reporting overload takes up a full third of the 
clinician manager’s time, time that is no longer spent on clinical care, clinical management, 
service coordination, and quality assurance, which are so important in environments with 
insufficient human resources.  
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Figure 1. Number of full days per quarter spent writing reports by district medical officer (Morogoro, 
Tanzania) 
This figure is highly representative of the reporting duties of health facility managers in 
Tanzania a decade ago, and is similarly representative of the situation in most aid-dependent 
countries in the region now. However, what has changed in the ten years since, and what 
these sorts of graphics, produced by McKinsey and other for-profit business consultants, 
justified, was the transfer of the task of data collection and report writing from the Ministry 
of Health managers to NGOs (the ‘implementing partners’). This ‘necessary’ transfer of 
report writing to outside entities fully excludes the health facility staff from any authentic 
engagement with their data beyond primary documentation, leading to profound changes in 
how global health is practiced.  
As data vacuuming needs increase in number and complexity, the hiring of expatriate 
advisors, dedicated solely to monitoring and evaluation, is introduced as a practice by 
external funding agencies to support ministries of health in the revision, updating, and 
monitoring of their bloated reporting systems, and often carrying out the data collection 
themselves without participation of ministry of health staff. In many instances, ‘transnational 
networks’ maintained by NGOs, as described by Appadurai (2000, 17), are delegated to 
complete these tasks by donors as intermediate technical assistance (ostensibly to ‘build 
capacity’ in the health workforce to collect these added indicators), or to meet data-driven 
deliverables that are tied to funding disbursement.  
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It is also common to see the revision of public sector health forms and registries being 
carried out by technical working groups composed primarily of bilateral, multilateral, and 
NGO agency representatives rather than of ministry of health leadership who will ultimately 
oversee their implementation. These ‘outside’ advisors, with agendas to serve their home 
governments, wield considerable power and represent donor interests (Redfield 2012). This 
power imbalance in what should be country-led processes, has produced, in many cases, the 
veritable silencing of ministry of health employees when key decisions concerning tools and 
strategies are made. In these selective, technical workgroup meetings, donor representatives 
are known to make strong cases for their desired strategies, goals, and metrics.  
One informant from Mozambique, who has worked for both the Ministry of Health and 
NGOs, described a particularly tense workgroup meeting where revisions to forms were 
underway. Over the three-day meeting, the forms steadily grew in length and complexity at 
the behest of expatriate technical advisors, while the participation of representatives from 
the Ministry of Health grew steadily more silent. The informant protested the additions, 
finally taking aside the lead staff person from the ministry in a private conversation, to 
understand why she wasn’t protesting the forms’ adaptations. The lead replied simply, ‘They 
are just going to do what they are going to do. It is better not to talk so they can finish’. 
Another informant who works at the Mozambique Ministry of Health went as far as to call 
these workgroup meetings ‘donor clubs’ within the Ministry of Health. These institutional 
practices resonate with those in other countries as well. In Lesotho, monthly health and 
development ‘partner forums’ were attended by major NGOs, UN agencies, and donors 
working in Lesotho, but officials from the Ministry of Health and other government 
agencies were only occasionally invited as guests to join the conversations, which focused on 
coordinating and streamlining initiatives in the country, including data-gathering practices.  
More alarming is the practice – in the name of efficiency and impartiality – of facility-level 
data collection by external NGO teams, who literally descend on health units and harvest the 
data required by their donor, with limited to no involvement of health facility staff. In 
Mozambique, teams will either stay on site and collect data over a series of days or just come 
out to collect the registry books and bring them back to their NGO offices to harvest in the 
comfort of air conditioning for a period of days. Industry is stepping forward to meet this 
new reality, by producing software tools such as Capricity® to vacuum the data into 
functional datasets for researchers in donor countries. This specific software promises to 
transform digital photos of registries into databases. This is just one example of the entire 
industry of donor-driven data collection that sustains and reinforces this unequal partnership 
under the guise of promoting data for decision making. But the question remains: whose 
data-driven decision making is being facilitated – that of health managers in poor countries, 
or the global health industry? Another similar group, AidStream, has also arisen to meet 
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donor reporting needs. AidStream (n.d.) explains on its website that it is not focused on 
strengthening the health systems of poor countries, rather its niche work meets the needs of 
NGOs in this donor-driven data collection reality:  
We built AidStream because we could see how complex IATI [International Aid 
Transparency Initiative] was for organisations without dedicated tech support (which 
is most of you!). We wanted to help achieve IATI’s goals of making aid data open and 
transparent, and ultimately, improving outcomes and so we decided to make it as easy 
as possible for aid organisations to publish that very same data.  
The use of parallel data systems abound in data vacuuming, with some being managed 
exclusively for donor agencies or NGOs, and acting as a quality check to the national health 
information systems. The US government is one entity that supports parallel data system 
capture via its partner agencies, both for routine health information and population-level 
surveys. Data is eventually shared with the host government once the data has been cleaned 
and synthesized into tables and figures, on the auspices that presenting summary results in a 
finished format will improve data utilization and evidence-based decision making. However, 
removing engagement with the data during the cleaning and analysis process effectively 
diminishes the recipient countries’ agency. Their involvement is fundamentally superficial, 
making it difficult to eventually transfer back the task. It should be noted that data quality, as 
defined as availability and reliability across health-system levels, has, in many settings, 
improved dramatically with these donor supports. However, the actual perceived ownership 
and use of data for decision making in recipient countries continues to lag (Uthman et al. 
2015; Owiredu 2017). 
A fundamental paradox related to the development of monitoring and evaluation 
frameworks exists in these unequal partnerships. As we have discussed, a growing number of 
indicators are tracked in poor countries, often at the imposition of donor agencies. If the 
driving force behind the adoption of new, more complex indicators is to introduce audit 
culture in recipient countries, and deny these countries equal say in their selection, what will 
drive ministries of health to use these data to inform decision making? Without the express 
‘buy-in’ and engagement of government structures, data collection and use is outsourced and 
becomes a de facto donor activity.  
Under this practice, data quality only improves from the point of vacuuming, in other words, 
from the point of the health-facility report (which then travels to electronic reports at the 
district, provincial, and national level). However, data quality diminishes at the point of 
entry, namely in ward registries where data availability and accuracy remain poor (Rowe et al. 
2009; Rowe et al. 2007; Hazel et al. 2013). In one large seven-
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Mozambique, a foundation supported data quality improvement through improved data 
literacy and use of frontline and district level managers. As part of the study, primary health 
care data was assessed annually across twenty-seven health facilities in Sofala Province for 
availability and reliability between 2009 and 2013.4 Over five years, semiannual meetings 
were held in each district during which district and facility managers spent three days 
reviewing and explaining their data to one another. With this simple but targeted audit and 
feedback intervention, data reliability improved dramatically from 54 to 87 percent overall 
(see figure 2) (Wagenaar et al. 2015).  
What this example highlights is that there is no short cut to improve data quality and use at 
the health-facility level. Auditing practices such as data vacuuming are destructive because 
they do not engage health workers. Those who are providing services need to be engaged in 
the design, selection, collection, analysis, and use of data in order for health services to 
improve. NGOs, donors, and other stakeholders need to prioritize funding for this 
grassroots work if they want to move beyond audit logic. Finally, engagement and leadership 
from ministries of health are required and cannot be outsourced if authentic data systems, 
fed and used by health workers, and capable of tracking both infectious and non-
communicable diseases over time, are to be built and sustained. In large part the success of 
the project in Sofala Province stemmed from the tremendous leadership of the provincial 
health director and the monitoring and evaluation team, who spent long days and weekends 
in remote districts, working with their teams and demonstrating their dedication to 
improving data quality and use at all levels.   
 
 
 
4 The indicators collected included the number of institutional births, number of first antenatal care visits, 
number of outpatient visits, and the number of third diphtheria, tetanus toxoids, whole-cell pertussis, 
hepatitis B, haemophilus influenzae type b (DTP-HepB-Hib) vaccines (note these vaccines are 
administered as a single pentavalent vaccine) administered by health facility. Concordance of these 
four indicators was assessed over twelve months across four levels of the health system, using health 
facility ward registries, health facility paper reports, and electronic reports at the district and 
provincial levels. We calculated the concordance of data between various data collection instruments. 
Afterwards, we ranked the facilities from highest to lowest data concordance between 2009 and 2013. 
For example, in 2013, health facility ‘Z’ had the highest data concordance and health facility ‘O’ had 
the lowest as noted in the table.  
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Figure 2. Annual data concordance across twenty-seven health facilities in Sofala Province, 2009–2013 
(Gimbel 2016) 
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Ministry of health leaders understand that data collected as part of a funding requirement 
rather than an activity of intrinsic value for health-system strengthening is devoid of meaning 
to health workers at the frontline. Data vacuuming is an extractive phenomenon that has no 
relationship to partnership – the egalitarian ideal of collaboration espoused in the Alma Ata 
Declaration – because unequal power dynamics privilege donor priorities above local ones. 
This argument exists beyond global health and has been explored in the broader aid field 
(Bruun Jensen 2013). Ultimately, this lack of true collaboration in the collection of data and 
its use represents a missed opportunity to jointly build capacity to collect, interpret, and 
improve data collection, analysis, and application. The Sustainable Development Goals 
announced in 2015 – and specifically the goal 3.8 to ‘Achieve universal health coverage’, 
underscores the urgent task of redirecting data gathering and analysis efforts toward local 
health system strengthening, and challenging the glaring inequalities that currently 
characterize the data extraction regime by institutions in rich countries (United Nations 
2017; Sundewall, Engstrand, and Nordstrom 2018). The increasing sophistication and scale 
of this vacuuming within the global health space has deepened global disparities and 
undermined local sovereignty. It is time to turn that sophistication and technology toward 
building local capacity, strengthening management, and expanding health systems to achieve 
universal coverage.  
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